

Guerre d'invasion russe en Ukraine: État du terrain militaire, décembre 2022



PROPOSAL:

- Returning Ukraine by force: Russia's military front
 - Debacle Phase 1: Russia's Failure to Seize Kiev and turn back Ukraine
 - Phase 2: Donbass, a (failing) reverting (downturn) offensive?
 - Phase 3: Overcoming the war of attrition?
 - Phase 4?
- Some lessons learned so far
- Some scenarios







Ukraine : le point sur l'offensive russe

- Au 24 février, premier jour de l'offensive (20 heures, heure de Paris)
- Au 1^{er} mars (21 heures, heure de Paris)
- Principaux fronts urbains
- Port pris par les Russes




- Etat allié de Moscou
- Territoire annexé par la Russie en 2014
- Territoire séparatiste contrôlé par les prorusses
- Pays membres de l'Union européenne

Infographie *Le Monde*
Source : Institute for the Study of War





Source: Institute for the Study of War (21:00 GMT, 16 March), BBC research, Centre for Information Resilience, Bellingcat and the Conflict Intelligence Team




Source: UK MoD / Institute for the Study of War (21:00 GMT, 16 March) **BBC**



Source: UK MoD / Institute for the Study of War (21:00 GMT, 16 March) **BBC**




March 28th



The Chronology of Russia's invasion of Ukraine

- Forward line of Russian troops by:
- Feb 24th
 - Mar 3rd
 - Mar 10th
 - Mar 17th
 - Mar 24th
 - Recaptured by Ukraine



Au 3 avril, 20 heures (heure de Paris)

Reconquête des troupes ukrainiennes



Avancée maximale des troupes russes



Repli des troupes russes



Zone d'opération russe



1^{er} avril 2 avril 3 avril 4 avril



Sources : ISW ; War Mapper ; Le Monde Cartographie Le Monde






UPDATE ON UKRAINE
31 August 2022

RUSSIAN ATTACKS AND TROOP LOCATIONS

Warning: Control and Contested areas are for illustrative purposes only and should not be taken as being to scale. DI products are not to be taken as necessarily representing the view of the UK government on boundaries, political status or place names.




- Likely Axis of Advance
- Likely Ukrainian Advance
- Regional Boundary
- Disputed Boundary
- Grouping of Forces
- Russian Controlled Area
- Contested Area
- Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant



Novorussian Federation
Новороссийская Федерация



© 2022, www.galaxymedia.com



Malgré l'accord d'Istanbul, le blocus naval persiste

--- Blocus naval russe en mer Noire

Port sous contrôle


- russe
- ukrainien, soumis au blocus russe et faisant partie de l'accord d'Istanbul du 22 juillet
- Cargos chargés de produits agricoles partis depuis l'accord d'Istanbul

La Russie concentre ses efforts sur le Donbass, mais peine à progresser malgré sa stratégie de pilonnage

- 500
200
100
 Frappes d'artillerie depuis le 1^{er} avril
- Présence des troupes russes au 1^{er} avril
- Gains des forces russes depuis le basculement de l'effort de guerre vers le Donbass (du 1^{er} avril au 22 août)

- Ligne de front au 1^{er} juillet au 22 août
- Ligne de cessez-le-feu en 2015
- Frontière administrative des oblasts de Donetsk et Louhansk

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of September 1, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, and Daniel Mealie © 2022 Institute for the Study of War and AEL's Critical Threats Project

- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Major Railroads
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

L'Ukraine mène des attaques profondes et ciblées sur l'arrière du front en préparation

Figure 1: Russian and Ukrainian Force Disposition

June 2022




FORCES

- Ukrainian
- Russian

FRONT LINE

MAJOR RAIL LINES



Note: This map was last updated as of June 1, 2022.

Source: CSIS compilation and analysis of multiple sources (see endnote 4). For a list of the abbreviations, see the appendix.

Au 10 septembre, 2 heures (heure de Paris)

FORCES UKRAINIENNES

- Territoire repris par les forces ukrainiennes
- Contre-offensive ukrainienne


FORCES RUSSES

- Zone de présence ou d'avancée des troupes russes
- ◆ Principales villes contrôlées par les forces russes
- Axe de ravitaillement depuis la Russie




- ▨ Territoire annexé par la Russie en 2014
- ▨ Territoire séparatiste contrôlé par les russes



Sources : ISW ; @War_Mapper
Infographie Le Monde



Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of September 7, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of September 10, 2022, 3:00 PM ET





- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Key Ukrainian Roads
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Key Ukrainian Roads
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, and Daniel Mealie
© 2022 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project


Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, and Daniel Mealie
© 2022 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project





SOME LESSONS LEARNED

- ✓ Don't say "It's not in the interest of Russia", well...
- ✓ We hardly saw Russia was evolving else...
Likewise it did not see Ukraine also did...
- ✓ Reality of RAF in warfare >< projected image in PR
(demonstration ≠ implementation)
- ✓ 15-20 % of resources to those who do 80% of the job, that's little...
- ✓ Key chronic weakness: human resources/ staffing/ command
- ✓ Capability gaps, logistics, communications, EW, ground-air integration...
- ✓ Combination of arms and effects makes a difference. Yet,
- ✓ Stocks are survival
- ✓ Technics/capabilities are only part of this:
combination of tactical choices; coordination of forces and means;
quality, will/moral and intelligences/agility of those who implement
(+ enemy's responses)
- ✓ Is the sky to dangerous for humans?
- ✓ Atoms after all/ Multi-faceted reality of nuclear brinkmanship









Item 5 - Draft resolution A/ES-11/L.1

Aggression against Ukraine

| | | | | | | |
|--|--|--|--|---|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> AFGHANISTAN | <input type="checkbox"/> CAMEROON | <input type="checkbox"/> FINLAND | <input type="checkbox"/> KUWAIT | <input type="checkbox"/> NEPAL | <input type="checkbox"/> SAUDI ARABIA | <input type="checkbox"/> UKRAINE |
| <input type="checkbox"/> ALBANIA | <input type="checkbox"/> CANADA | <input type="checkbox"/> FRANCE | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> KYRGYZSTAN | <input type="checkbox"/> NETHERLANDS | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SENEGAL | <input type="checkbox"/> UNITED ARAB EMIR... |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ALGERIA | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CENTRAL AFR REP... | <input type="checkbox"/> GABON | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> LAO PDR | <input type="checkbox"/> NEW ZEALAND | <input type="checkbox"/> SERBIA | <input type="checkbox"/> UNITED KINGDOM |
| <input type="checkbox"/> ANDORRA | <input type="checkbox"/> CHAD | <input type="checkbox"/> GAMBIA | <input type="checkbox"/> LATVIA | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NICARAGUA | <input type="checkbox"/> SEYCHELLES | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNITED REP TANZA... |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ANGOLA | <input type="checkbox"/> CHILE | <input type="checkbox"/> GEORGIA | <input type="checkbox"/> LEBANON | <input type="checkbox"/> NIGER | <input type="checkbox"/> SIERRA LEONE | <input type="checkbox"/> UNITED STATES |
| <input type="checkbox"/> ANTIGUA-BARBUDA | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CHINA | <input type="checkbox"/> GERMANY | <input type="checkbox"/> LESOTHO | <input type="checkbox"/> NIGERIA | <input type="checkbox"/> SINGAPORE | <input type="checkbox"/> URUGUAY |
| <input type="checkbox"/> ARGENTINA | <input type="checkbox"/> COLOMBIA | <input type="checkbox"/> GHANA | <input type="checkbox"/> LIBERIA | <input type="checkbox"/> NORTH MACEDONIA | <input type="checkbox"/> SLOVAKIA | <input type="checkbox"/> UZBEKISTAN |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ARMENIA | <input type="checkbox"/> COMOROS | <input type="checkbox"/> GREECE | <input type="checkbox"/> LIECHTENSTEIN | <input type="checkbox"/> NORWAY | <input type="checkbox"/> SLOVENIA | <input type="checkbox"/> VANUATU |
| <input type="checkbox"/> AUSTRALIA | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONGO | <input type="checkbox"/> GRENADA | <input type="checkbox"/> LITHUANIA | <input type="checkbox"/> OMAN | <input type="checkbox"/> SOLOMON ISLANDS | <input type="checkbox"/> VENEZUELA |
| <input type="checkbox"/> AUSTRIA | <input type="checkbox"/> COSTA RICA | <input type="checkbox"/> GUATEMALA | <input type="checkbox"/> LUXEMBOURG | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PAKISTAN | <input type="checkbox"/> SOMALIA | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> VIET NAM |
| <input type="checkbox"/> AZERBAIJAN | <input type="checkbox"/> COTE D'IVOIRE | <input type="checkbox"/> GUINEA | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MADAGASCAR | <input type="checkbox"/> PALAU | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SOUTH AFRICA | <input type="checkbox"/> YEMEN |
| <input type="checkbox"/> BAHAMAS | <input type="checkbox"/> CROATIA | <input type="checkbox"/> GUINEA-BISSAU | <input type="checkbox"/> MALAWI | <input type="checkbox"/> PANAMA | <input type="checkbox"/> SOUTH SUDAN | <input type="checkbox"/> ZAMBIA |
| <input type="checkbox"/> BAHRAIN | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CUBA | <input type="checkbox"/> GUYANA | <input type="checkbox"/> MALAYSIA | <input type="checkbox"/> PAPUA NEW GUINEA | <input type="checkbox"/> SPAIN | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ZIMBABWE |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> BANGLADESH | <input type="checkbox"/> CYPRUS | <input type="checkbox"/> HAITI | <input type="checkbox"/> MALDIVES | <input type="checkbox"/> PARAGUAY | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SRI LANKA | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> BARBADOS | <input type="checkbox"/> CZECH REPUBLIC | <input type="checkbox"/> HONDURAS | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MALI | <input type="checkbox"/> PERU | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SUDAN | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> BELARUS | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DEM PR OF KOREA | <input type="checkbox"/> HUNGARY | <input type="checkbox"/> MALTA | <input type="checkbox"/> PHILIPPINES | <input type="checkbox"/> SURINAME | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> BELGIUM | <input type="checkbox"/> DEM REP OF THE C... | <input type="checkbox"/> ICELAND | <input type="checkbox"/> MARSHALL ISLANDS | <input type="checkbox"/> POLAND | <input type="checkbox"/> SWEDEN | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> BELIZE | <input type="checkbox"/> DENMARK | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INDIA | <input type="checkbox"/> MAURITANIA | <input type="checkbox"/> PORTUGAL | <input type="checkbox"/> SWITZERLAND | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> BENIN | <input type="checkbox"/> DJIBOUTI | <input type="checkbox"/> INDONESIA | <input type="checkbox"/> MAURITIUS | <input type="checkbox"/> QATAR | <input type="checkbox"/> SYRIAN ARAB REP... | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> BHUTAN | <input type="checkbox"/> DOMINICA | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> IRAN (ISLAMIC REP... | <input type="checkbox"/> MEXICO | <input type="checkbox"/> REP OF KOREA | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TAJIKISTAN | |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> BOLIVIA | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DOMINICAN REP... | <input type="checkbox"/> IRAQ | <input type="checkbox"/> MICRONESIA (FS) | <input type="checkbox"/> REP OF MOLDOVA | <input type="checkbox"/> THAILAND | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> BOSNIA-HERZEGOV... | <input type="checkbox"/> ECUADOR | <input type="checkbox"/> IRELAND | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MONGOLIA | <input type="checkbox"/> ROMANIA | <input type="checkbox"/> TIMOR-LESTE | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> BOTSWANA | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EGYPT | <input type="checkbox"/> ISRAEL | <input type="checkbox"/> MONACO | <input type="checkbox"/> RUSSIAN FED... | <input type="checkbox"/> TOGO | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> BRAZIL | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EL SALVADOR | <input type="checkbox"/> ITALY | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MONTENEGRO | <input type="checkbox"/> RWANDA | <input type="checkbox"/> TONGA | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> BRUNEI DARUSSAL... | <input type="checkbox"/> EQUATORIAL GUINEA | <input type="checkbox"/> JAMAICA | <input type="checkbox"/> MOROCCO | <input type="checkbox"/> SAINT KITTS-NEVIS | <input type="checkbox"/> TRINIDAD-TOBAGO | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> BULGARIA | <input type="checkbox"/> ERITREA | <input type="checkbox"/> JAPAN | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MOZAMBIQUE | <input type="checkbox"/> SAINT LUCIA | <input type="checkbox"/> TUNISIA | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> BURKINA FASO | <input type="checkbox"/> ESTONIA | <input type="checkbox"/> JORDAN | <input type="checkbox"/> MYANMAR | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SAINT VINCENT-GR... | <input type="checkbox"/> TURKEY | |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> BURUNDI | <input type="checkbox"/> ESWATINI | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> KAZAKHSTAN | <input type="checkbox"/> NAMIBIA | <input type="checkbox"/> SAMOA | <input type="checkbox"/> TURKMENISTAN | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> CABO VERDE | <input type="checkbox"/> ETHIOPIA | <input type="checkbox"/> KENYA | <input type="checkbox"/> NAURU | <input type="checkbox"/> SAN MARINO | <input type="checkbox"/> TUVALU | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> CAMBODIA | <input type="checkbox"/> FIJI | <input type="checkbox"/> KIRIBATI | | <input type="checkbox"/> SAO TOME-PRINCIPE | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UGANDA | |



IN FAVOUR:141



AGAINST:5




ABSTENTION:34




États ayant adopté des sanctions à l'encontre de la Russie suite à l'invasion de l'Ukraine

COMPRENDRE
LE MONDE



Votes à l'AGNU de la résolution A/RES/ES-11/1 sur la condamnation de l'agression russe contre l'Ukraine - 2 mars 2022

COMPRENDRE
LE MONDE




Sources : ONU

Crédits : IRIS - A. Diacre ; V. Pelpel; M. Verzeroli

Votes à l'AGNU sur l'exclusion de la Russie du Conseil des Droits de l'homme - 7 avril 2022

COMPRENDRE
LE MONDE



Sources : ONU

Crédits : IRIS - A. Diacre ; V. Pelpel; M. Verzeroli

SCENARIOS

- ✓ Worn-out-Ukraine defeat facing slow-paced Russian grinding warfare (“Mr Seguin’s Goat scenario”) (cf. “salami strategy”)
- ✓ (Zero-sum tactical/ops game / reciprocal war of attrition → “Nor (full) war, nor (real) peace” situation; time-sequenced protracted conflict long-term trajectory (!!! open low-intensity protracted conflict + “salami bis”)
- ✓ A hedging “peace”/ cease-fire/ de-escalation agreement (cf. Minsk III)
- ✓ “Mr Seguin’s Goat devours the wolf”
--- Can a nuclear power lose a war? When benighted...
- ✓ Back to the wall “Headlong rush forward scenario” --- vertical and/or horizontal escalation...



... ***Escalate-to-(de)escalate***...

V. Putin clearly frustrated that NATO's supply of lethal weaponry to Ukraine, coupled with his own army's patchy performance, is hindering his plans to bring Ukraine back under Moscow's control.

His warnings to the West are becoming increasingly strident.

But NATO isn't backing down and, if anything, it is stepping up its long-term military support for Ukraine.

Extension of the notion of "victory" (U.S) --- *"no longer just to try to make Putin back away from Ukraine in face of the staggering cost of his war for Russia [a strategy that has never worked on its own] or internal pressure [from the people or its administrative-mafia oligarchy, a very risky option] , but also now to defeat, if not destroy, the Russian army on the ground."* (M. Goya)

So what are Putin's options? ("Partial") Mobilization, and then, for what?



They may include, in ascending order of seriousness, the following:

- ✓ Intensify Russian precision missile strikes on western arms supplies coming into Ukraine
- ✓ Targeting Ukraine's command and government centres in the heart of Kyiv, even when western officials are present
- ✓ Targeting western embassies in Kyiv or their consulates in Lviv
- ✓ Broadening/Trans-nationalizing the war, activating the Transnistrian front...
- ✓ Carrying out a chemical attack in a built-up area in Ukraine, most likely blaming it on the Ukrainians
- ✓ Targeting an airbase or depot supplying arms to Ukraine across the border in a NATO country - this would be a major escalation
- ✓ Launching a major cyber attack on western nations most actively helping Ukraine
- ✓ Suwalki Corridor (Gap)...
- ✓ Firing a "tactical" nuclear warhead inside Ukraine - this could destroy something the size of an urban district but its strategic effect would be huge, breaking the 77-year-long global nuclear embargo and generating a mushroom cloud and radioactive fallout

And what about the elephant in the room – a full-scale nuclear exchange?

Most defence and intelligence officers currently assess Putin's veiled nuclear threats to be rhetoric aimed at scaring NATO off helping Ukraine defend itself. That said, they also believe that if the battles for the Donbas do not go his way then Putin will be tempted to escalate this war in some form. He cannot afford a long drawn-out stalemate.







Т.Г. ШЕВЧЕНКО